Justice Chef Noonab Appeal: Lucifer McCalister Vs. Premium Deluxe Motorsport

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Good Citizen
Bar Certified Attorney
Nov 14, 2020
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Elisha Wesler
Username: Royal_Vulpes

Plaintiff Lucifer McCalister

Defendant Premium Deluxe Motorsport

What kind of appeal is this? Appeal

Link to Original Docket https://nonstoprp.net/index.php?threads/lucifer-mccalister-vs-pdm-premium-deluxe-motorsport-labor.31139/

Case Number 23-C1001

Reasons Detailed Below I. Error in Inference - When this trial was presented before the District Court, we as the plaintiff asserted that the exception of "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" to the "at-will employment" laws, that are accepted and practiced in law, was sufficient grounds to file the tort/claim against the defendant. The Cornell Law, under the employment-at-will doctrine, states: "Exceptions
Even if an employment agreement contains an at-will provision, there are certain reasons as to why termination could still be wrongful. These exceptions will typically vary by state.

Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception bars an employer from terminating employees in violation of well-established public policy of the state. As an example, in many states an employee may not be terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim after an on-the-job injury.

Many states do not allow employers to terminate employees for refusal to violate the law at the employer's request. Criteria for what violates public policy in a particular state varies from state to state.

Implied Contract Exception
The implied contract exception means that an employee may have an expectation of a fixed term or even indefinite employment based on something the supervisor has done. This can take the form of employer's statements, an employer’s practice of only firing employees for cause, or an assertion in the employee handbook that specific termination procedures will be followed.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Some states recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships. Under this exception, an employer typically may not terminate an employee in bad faith or terminate an employee when the termination is motivated by malice."
- https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/employment-at-will_doctrine

We as the plaintiff noted what the defendant had stated, and provided evidence backing what was stated. The lower court ruled stating "The 'At Will Employment' section of the Business Bureau is recognized as law by this, as we do not have a centralized law library and this is an official legal document approved by the Chief Justice of San Andreas." With that said, we assert that this was the lower court stating that it was not willing to establish case precedent that would allow changes and additions to the current "at-will employment" laws.

In addition, the lower court continued by stating from the regulation "This means that in the absence of a contractual agreement between an employer and an employee establishing a definite term of employment, the relationship is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance of either party." What the lower court cited was not what was being claimed. It was a breach of trust as cited in the complaint and in evidence, which in accordance to the exceptions to "at-will employment" would fall under the "Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing" or simply referred to as "Good Faith."

When reviewing "Good Faith," Cornell Law School stated, "Good faith is a broad term that’s used to encompass honest dealing. Depending on the exact setting, good faith may require an honest belief or purpose, faithful performance of duties, observance of fair dealing standards, or an absence of fraudulent intent.

A fiduciary relationship creates a duty of good faith between the agent and the principal. The breach of this duty of good faith can lead to liability. Failure to act in good faith is known as bad faith and is generally considered to be a level of culpability greater than negligence."
- https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/good_faith

In the complaint, the defendant had noted that the plaintiff had caused an issue of trust, which applied in legal terms means that there was an act of "bad faith." Cornell Law states, "Bad faith refers to dishonesty or fraud in a transaction. Depending on the exact setting, bad faith may mean a dishonest belief or purpose, untrustworthy performance of duties, neglect of fair dealing standards, or fraudulent intent. It is often related to a breach of the obligation inherent in all contracts to deal with the other parties in good faith and with fair dealing."
- https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/bad_faith

It was also apparent in the exceptions above that the "Implied Contract Exception" that states "an employee may have an expectation of a fixed term or even indefinite employment based on something the supervisor has done. This can take the form of employer's statements, an employer’s practice of only firing employees for cause, or an assertion in the employee handbook that specific termination procedures will be followed." This means that if there are employee handbooks, business conduct, or procedures in place, this also is an exception to the rule. Overall, if an employee is told they were in violation of such reasoning, specific incidents recorded, and steps to enact disciplinary actions must be in place.

In Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), it states "Contracts — Employer and employee — Oral employment-at-will agreements — Terminable for any reason not contrary to law — Circumstances to be considered in determining terms of discharge — Promissory estoppel applicable, when... 2. The facts and circumstances surrounding an oral employment-at-will agreement, including the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company policy, or any other fact which may illuminate the question, can be considered by the trier of fact in order to determine the agreement's explicit and implicit terms concerning discharge."

As stated by Cornell Law for "Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing" or "Good Faith" and in the "Implied Contract Exception," when reviewing what the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled on, it held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could modify employment at will relationships if three conditions were met. First, the employer must make a promise that the employer should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the employee. The Supreme Court recognized that in the case there was an implied contract and promissory estoppel (the doctrine that a party may recover on the basis of a promise made when the party's reliance on that promise was reasonable, and the party attempting to recover detrimentally relied on the promise).

The basis of promissory estoppel can be further compounded by the US Supreme Court's Ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 501 US 663 (1991)(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/501/663/), in which the Supreme Court recognized promissory estoppel as a "state law doctrine creating legal obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties that are enforceable."

II. Purpose of the complaint - The purpose of this case was to aid in the establishment of case precedent to allow limitations as to how an employer terminates employees within a guideline of the "at-will" status and not utilize the broad and easily abused doctrine this state has at this current time. This case would allow the State to build off of this case and mold the "at-will" regulations around the particulars of what this case would entail. This case would further allow that should employers fire their employee based on a violation of trust or violations of business "conduct" eliminates a mere termination without justification or proof of actual malice. This case would also establish promissory estoppel when employers provide such rules, codes of conduct and employee handbooks.

I implore the Supreme Court to reconsider this case and let it be heard as this case would aid in establishing fair employment laws and limit what employers can use as means to dismiss, terminate, and/or suspend their employees when implied contracts, promissory estoppels, and/or good faith is utilized.

Please list the restitution sought for this appeal I. Have this case ruling for dismissal to be overturned
II. Have this case remanded back to the District Court

Attorney Signature Elisha Wesler

Bar Number 23-0106

Chance Noonan

Original Troggy
District Attorney's Office
Aug 31, 2020
Case - 23-31139
Federal Justice Chef Noonab, Principal Opinion

In the appeal of case 23-31139, I have thoroughly reviewed the arguments presented by the plaintiff in their appeal. After careful consideration of the case law submitted and the relevant legal principles, I must deny the appeal and affirm the decision of the District Court. Allow me to address the key points raised in the appeal.

I. Error in Inference - The plaintiff contends that the District Court erred in not recognizing the exception of the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" to the "at-will employment" laws. They argue that the defendant's actions constituted a breach of trust, falling under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. While the plaintiff references various exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, it is important to note that these exceptions vary by state.

The plaintiff's reliance on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is misplaced in this case. The doctrine of good faith generally requires honest dealing, faithful performance of duties, observance of fair dealing standards, and an absence of fraudulent intent. However, the plaintiff fails to provide compelling evidence that the defendant acted in bad faith or breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Mere allegations of a breach of trust do not automatically establish a violation of this doctrine.

Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the existence of an employee handbook or specific termination procedures should create an exception to at-will employment. While such factors may be considered in certain circumstances, the plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they apply in this case. Without a clear contractual agreement or established practice, the relationship between the parties remains at will, as acknowledged by the lower court.

II. Purpose of the Complaint - The plaintiff contends that the purpose of this case is to establish case precedent and limitations on how employers terminate employees within the framework of at-will employment. They argue that this case would allow for the development of fair employment laws and the incorporation of promissory estoppel when employers provide rules, codes of conduct, and employee handbooks.

While the plaintiff's objectives may be commendable, the scope of this case is limited to the specific facts presented. The establishment of case precedents and the development of employment laws fall within the purview of legislative proposals. The role of the appellate court is to review the lower court's decision based on the evidence and legal arguments presented. Case precedent has been set and changed through the appellate court in the past but my ruling has no intention to do so. Use the appropriate court if any party wishes to pursue changes to legislature or law.

Based on the information provided and the analysis of relevant case law, there is no sufficient basis to overturn the lower court's ruling or remand the case back for further consideration. The District Court correctly applied the applicable law and found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a valid claim under the exceptions to at-will employment.

Therefore, the restitution sought by the plaintiff, which includes overturning the case ruling for dismissal and remanding it back to the District Court, cannot be granted. The decision of the District Court is affirmed, and the appeal is denied.

I trust this response clarifies the reasons for denying the appeal and affirming the decision of the District Court.

So Ordered,
Justice Chef Noonab
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